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During his presidency, Ronald Reagan conducted an aggressive campaign to transfer many 
of the functions of government to private business, including the publication of government 
documents. Although discussions of privatization have largely dropped out of the library 
literature following the withdrawal of some of the Reagan era’s most controversial policies, I
argue that privatization of government information continues to be a pressing issue to the 
current day. One reason that it is largely overlooked in the contemporary literature is the 
tendency to view privatization as an issue only when it implicates the value of access to 
information. In lieu of this narrow focus on information access and restriction, this essay will
present an analysis of privatized information that places it in the broader context of capital 
accumulation. It does so by articulating the privatization of government information as an 
instance of accumulation by dispossession, a contemporary adaptation of Marx’s account of 
primitive accumulation introduced by geographer David Harvey. Taken in this context, it is 
possible to formulate a broader critique of recent government policy directed at transferring 
to capital the ability to control the flow of information in order to serve the goal of 
accumulation, even though restriction of public access to information is only one possible 
outcome of this process.
Government Information as Commodity
Ronald Reagan and his policy advisors were deeply impressed by the idea derived from the 
work of Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell that information was “a commodity capable of 
fueling a dramatic economic recovery in America.”1 The passage of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 19802 and the creation of the Office of Administrative and Regulatory 
Affairs gave the executive branch Office of Management and Budget (OMB) power to put 
this idea into practice by setting information policy.3 In its articulation of information policy,
the information-as-commodity view was an integral part of the administration’s ideological 
commitment to a more general program of empowering capital by easing regulatory 
restrictions, suppressing the power of organized labor and, of particular relevance here, 
transferring various government functions to the private sector.4  
1 MICHAEL A. HARRIS, STAN A. HANNAH, AND PAMELA C. HARRIS, INTO THE FUTURE: THE FOUNDATION
OF LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ERA 61 (2nd ed. 1998).
2 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 21812 (1980).
3 Henry T. Blanke, Libraries and the Commercialization of Information: Towards a Critical Discourse of 
Librarianship 2 PROGRESSIVE LIBRARIAN 9, 11 (1991), 
http://www.progressivelibrariansguild.org/PL/PL02/009.pdf. 
4 See Harris, Hannah & Harris, supra note 1, at 61.
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Supporters of privatization often invoked populist rhetoric, claiming on behalf of “the 
American people” that federal programs were too intrusive, inefficient, and expensive;5 and 
that transferring the operation of a whole range of government activities to business would 
both reduce costs of and enhance their effectiveness.6 The mechanisms through which the 
agenda could be furthered were diverse, but could be accomplished through a combination 
of measures including the use of vouchers, private sector outsourcing, and sales of public 
assets.7  
Where government publishing was concerned, the goal of privatization was furthered by 
establishing strong preferences for reducing the overall number of government publications 
and for using private sector publishers whenever possible. An April 1981 Presidential 
moratorium on the production of any new audiovisual aids and publications set the tone for 
the new administration’s information policy.8 A series of OMB policies followed, requiring 
agency heads to carefully review their information dissemination practices with a particular 
eye towards information services that might be either eliminated or better provided by the 
private sector.9 In addition, agencies were encouraged through a combination of budget cuts 
and OMB policy to raise or institute fees for publications.10 OMB circular A-130 is widely 
regarded as the fullest statement of these principles. Reiterating the view that information is 
a commodity, it established a requirement that agencies review their information collection 
and dissemination practices to avoid publishing information already being disseminated by 
another organization, public or private; that agencies institute “cost recovery” or user charges
for those publications; and that agencies place “maximum feasible reliance” on the private 
sector for their publication needs.11   
In this atmosphere, the activities of the Government Printing Office (GPO, now Government
Publishing Office) were newly politicized. Reagan found a sympathetic appointee to head the
GPO in Danford Sawyer, his nominee for Public Printer. Sawyer was the owner of a Florida 
advertising agency and publishing company with no government experience who professed 
5 DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT: REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, xi (1988), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?
id=mdp.39015017633325&view=1up&seq=5.
6 Id. at 1.
7 Id. at 1-2.
8 Statement on Federal Audiovisual Aids and Publications, Jan. 20 to Dec. 31, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 364 
(April 20, 1981), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PPP-1981-book1.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 3.
11 50 Fed. Reg. 52,736 (Dec. 24, 1985), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1985-12-24/pdf/FR-
1985-12-24.pdf#page=1.   
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an interest in increasing the “efficiency” of the agency.12 Nonetheless, the existence of the 
agency itself continued to present an obstacle in the administration’s attempts to remove 
federal publishing activities to the private sector. Per the longstanding requirements of Title 
44, federal publications were required to be submitted to the GPO13 and were required to be 
made available to libraries participating in the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) 
free of charge.14 The Reagan-era GPO evinced its willingness to play along with industry 
prerogatives, such as appointing industry members to serve on the Depository Library 
Council, the advisory body which guides the GPO’s Director and Superintendent of 
Documents on depository library issues.15 However, the pre-existing institutional and legal 
structure of the GPO and the FDLP meant that it would to some extent stand in the way of 
many efforts at privatization. 
The Reagan-era Justice Department did its part to discourage an expansive view of the 
scope of the GPO’s mandate through its interpretation of separation of powers doctrine. In 
two 1984 memoranda, Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson argued that following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), separation of 
powers prevented Congress from requiring executive branch agencies to seek approval from 
the Joint Committee on Printing before going outside of the GPO for publication.16 In 
combination with developing OMB policy, this interpretation served to free agencies from 
the commitment to the GPO as publisher and, indeed, the need to publish in the first place.
Although the Reagan administration’s efforts at privatization received sustained scrutiny 
from the library community, the practice of privatization continued well beyond the 1980s. 
A 1998 Library Journal article, published by then-recently retired Superintendent of 
Documents Wayne Kelley, noted that the acquisition of government publications by private 
publishers continued on an ad hoc basis throughout the 1990s.17 Nonetheless, by the turn of 
the century it was clear that the government’s growing reliance on electronic publishing for 
information dissemination was becoming the most pressing issue regarding public 
12 Nomination of Danford L. Sawyer, Jr., to be Public Printer: Hearing before the Committee on Rules and
Administration, United States Senate, 97th Cong. (Jul. 13, 1981).
13 44 U.S.C. § 1710.
14 44 U.S.C. § 1902.
15 Diane Smith, The Commercialization and Privatization of Government Information, 12 GOV’T 
PUBLICATIONS REV. 44, 61 (1985), https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9390(85)90068-8.
16 James Bolner, The Reagan Administration vs. the Joint Committee on Printing: Constitutional 
Reflections, 12 GOV’T PUBLICATIONS REV. 97, 107-108 (1985), https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-
9390(85)90081-0.
17 Wayne P. Kelley, Keeping Public Information Public, LIBR. J., May 1998, at 34–37.
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information. In one of the later installments of its series on privatization and restriction of 
government information, Less Access to Less Information by and About the US Government, 
the American Library Association’s (ALA) Washington Office noted:
Another development, with major implications for public access, is the growing 
tendency of federal agencies to use computer and telecommunications technologies 
for data collection, storage, retrieval, and dissemination. This trend has resulted in 
the increased emergence of contractual arrangements with commercial firms to 
disseminate information collected at taxpayer expense, higher user charges for 
government information, and the proliferation of government information available 
in electronic format only. This trend toward electronic dissemination is occurring in 
all three branches of government. While automation clearly offers promises of 
savings, will public access to government information be further restricted for people
who cannot afford computers or pay for computer time?18
The consequences of the move to electronic publishing has channeled much of the 
contemporary debate over access to government information into increasingly technical 
discussions of the problem of preservation, or access over time, as presented by electronic 
media, although recent actions of the Trump administration have again raised the specter of 
overt content-based censorship of information produced by government agencies.19 This 
changing focus, along with some apparently positive developments regarding public access 
such as the anti-fee stance taken by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,20 has served to 
obscure what is perhaps an even larger issue regarding privatization of information over the 
last three decades in the wholesale push to transition government records and publications to 
electronic formats in the 1990s. The Clinton administration’s plan to build the “National 
18 AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON OFFICE, LESS ACCESS TO LESS INFORMATION BY AND 
ABOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, XXXI A 1998 CHRONOLOGY JUNE-DECEMBER, 4 (1998), 
https://archive.org/details/lessaccesstoless31amer.
19 In the tradition of the ALA’s Less Access to Less Information Series, the blog Free Government 
Information has documented a number of recent cases of removal of federal information about 
politically charged issues such as climate change and immigration. Less Access to Less Information by 
and about the U.S. Government, FREE GOV’T INFO., https://freegovinfo.info/less_access.  See, e.g., 
James R. Jacobs, EPA Greenwashes Its Fracking Site, Nov. 19, 2018, 
https://freegovinfo.info/node/13144; James R. Jacobs, EPA Eliminates Its Climate Change Websites, 
Nov. 9, 2018, https://freegovinfo.info/node/13134; James R. Jacobs, U.S. Historians are Fighting to Stop 
ICE from Erasing Records of Agency’s Treatment of Immigrants, Jul. 31, 2018 
https://freegovinfo.info/node/13027; James A. Jacobs, EPA Removes and Changes Climate Information 
from Its Website, Feb. 7, 2017, https://freegovinfo.info/node/11710  . 
20 Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995).  Susan McMullen, U.S. Government Information: Selected 
Current Issues in Public Access vs. Private Competition, 27 J. GOV’T INFO. 581 (2000), 
https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=librarypub.
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Information Infrastructure,” which would deliver, among other things, government 
information and services, emphasized the investment in and development of the privately 
owned utilities that would constitute the information “superhighway.”21 This plan was put 
into practice through a combination of government subsidies and deregulation of cable and 
telecommunications companies, cementing the long-term dependence of the public sector on
private business for its information dissemination activities.22
Privatization as accumulation by dispossession
The privatization policies pursued by the Reagan government and its successors are widely 
regarded as part of the global process of neoliberalization. David Harvey has argued that this
process be viewed as a deliberate project engaged in by economic elites to reassert their 
dominance as a class.23 The expansion of the welfare state in the post-war era imposed 
limitations on capital accumulation through its combination of redistributive policies, 
business regulation, and empowerment of organized labor.24 Neoliberalization had the aim 
of throwing off these restrictions on elite class power even as it converted the public goods 
produced by the welfare state into new avenues for accumulation.25  
Harvey’s account of neoliberalism expands upon Marxist theories of primitive accumulation 
into what he calls “accumulation by dispossession.”26 Marx devoted several chapters of 
Capital to an explanation of what he referred to as “so-called” primitive accumulation and 
the question of how the capitalist relations of production involving the division between 
owners and non-owners of the means of production came to be.27 Unlike liberal theorists 
who attempted to explain primitive accumulation as a function of the thrift and virtue of the 
bourgeoisie, Marx emphasized the element of force required for the transition to 
capitalism.28 Marx argued that the emergent capitalist class seized land and other resources 
21 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION (1993), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00296397c&view=1up&seq=3.
22 See NICK DYER-WITHEFORD, CYBER-MARX: CYCLES AND CIRCUITS OF STRUGGLE IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY CAPITALISM 33 (1999); See also Jane Bortnick Griffith & Marcia S. Smith, The 
Information Superhighway and the National Information Infrastructure (NII), 20 J. ACAD. 
LIBRARIANSHIP 93 (1994).
23 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 19 (2005).
24 David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 88 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER 145, 148 (2006), 
http://www.anthrocervone.org/development/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/David-Harvey.pdf.
25 See id. at 153.
26 DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 137-182 (2003). 
27 ALEX LAW, KEY CONCEPTS IN CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY, (2011), 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446251485  . 
28 KARL MARX, Capital, Vol. 1, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 191, 311 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972), 
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through often-violent imperialist struggles abroad. It also used its influence to affect the 
“enclosures of the commons” domestically, which both removed the peasant class from an 
independent means of subsistence and handed formerly public lands over to private 
ownership. Although there is some question of whether Marx regarded primitive 
accumulation as a distinctly precapitalist historical phase, later theorists have emphasized 
that primitive accumulation continues even under a late phase of capitalist development.29  
Privatization is a central aspect of Harvey’s expanded notion of primitive accumulation.  
Through the administrations of President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, and their commitments to neoliberal theory, “the whole orientation of state 
activity [was turned] away from the welfare state and towards active support for the ‘supply 
side’ conditions for capital accumulation.”30 The result of this newfound commitment to 
market liberalization “was to make a new round of ‘enclosure of the commons’ into an 
objective of state policies” with “assets held by the state or in common [being] released into 
the market where overaccumulating capital could invest in them, upgrade them, and 
speculate in them.”31 As Jim Glassman has summarized the idea, privatization has proved to 
be “one of the crucial ways in which capitalists have been able to ‘actively manufacture’ new 
realms for proletarianization and private appropriation of public property, even within the 
global core,” enabling a range of activities from “educational institutions to public utilities, 
health care, social housing, and a whole range of state enterprises involved in commodity 
production” to be turned over to the private sector for profit making.32  
If supporters of privatization argue it as a win-win situation—i.e., resulting in a reduced 
burden on “the taxpayer” and better services to the public in need—the long-term benefits of
the process have in fact accrued to the people in a position to speculate in the newly 
liberalized markets for formerly public goods. Harvey points to the example of Thatcher’s 
release of public housing to the private market:
At first blush this appeared to be a gift to the lower classes, who could now convert from 
rental to ownership at a relatively low cost, gain control over a valuable asset, and augment 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch26.htm  .  
29 Jim Glassman, Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, and Accumulation by ‘Extra-
Economic’ Means, 30 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 608, 613 (2006), 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132506070172.
30 HARVEY, NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 23, at 157.
31 Id. at 158.
32 Glassman, supra note 26, at 620 (citations omitted).
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their wealth. But once the transfer was accomplished housing speculation took over, 
particularly in prime central locations, eventually bribing, cajoling, or forcing low-income 
populations out into the periphery in cities like London, and turning erstwhile working-class 
housing estates into centres of intense gentrification.33
Focusing on privatization as a mode of enabling capital accumulation provides an instructive 
framework for viewing neoliberalism’s relationship to the welfare state. Contemporary 
libertarians often profess an extreme and uncompromising anti-statism, a polemical stance 
that many trace back to neoliberal progenitor F.A. Hayek, who associated the Keynesian 
welfare state with tyranny and totalitarianism for its attempts to plan the economy.34 The 
actual relationship between historically instantiated neoliberalism and the welfare state is 
more complex. Although in the US, modern business-friendly conservatism was galvanized 
by opposition to the New Deal (and to some extent, the Great Society programs of the 
1960s), it has done little to decrease the size of the “big government” it claims to find 
objectionable—in part because “big government” spending has long accrued to the benefit of
the owners of capital.35 From this perspective, it is not actually the size or complexity of the 
government that is problematic to capital. Instead, it is government’s propensity to stand in 
the way of accumulation by, for example, requiring the upper classes to pay taxes to 
subsidize social programs for the general welfare or requiring corporations to pay the costs 
of remediating negative externalities produced by their activities.  
As a result, neoliberal “rollback” of the welfare state has not been simply a matter of 
repealing New Deal or Great Society programs, but of subtly transferring the public goods 
generated by government programs to private ownership. While the GPO and the FDLP 
long pre-date the New Deal, the explosion of state building in the early 20th century was the 
source of much of the modern administrative state and its information collection, research, 
and development activities.36 The claim by GPO supporters that these items come within the 
Title 44 definition of government publications, and must therefore be submitted to the public
printer for dissemination to libraries free of charge, interfered with the ability to affect a 
33 HARVEY, NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 23, at 158.
34 F.A. HAYEK, The Road to Serfdom, 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK 157 and passim (Bruce 
Caldwell, ed. 2007).
35 See LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2003); see 
also JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL REASON 23 (2010) (discussing how neoliberal “roll-
back” of social welfare programs is often followed up with “roll-out” of government subsidized 
privatized services).
36 See Harold C. Relyea, Paperwork Reduction Act Reauthorization and Government Information 
Management Issues, 17 GOV’T. INFO. Q. 367, 368 (2000), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0740-
624X(00)00048-4.
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transfer of these goods to private ownership. As a “free good” that is not consumed when it 
is used, information must be made artificially scarce to secure its status as a commodity 
subject to private ownership, through intellectual property law, technological mechanisms 
such as digital rights management software, or by some other means.37 Private publishers 
could avail themselves of this free good by trying to make a profit from repackaging and 
reselling it, but the existence of a public printer that distributes copies of these publications 
for free or at cost has functioned as a stopgap on the profitability of such ventures.  
In the 1980s, the information industry’s lobbyists and the OMB converged on the position 
that it was inappropriate for the government to “compete” in this way with the private 
publishers in the dissemination of information.38 Likewise, the Reagan Justice Department’s 
theory that separation of powers prevented the GPO from making demands on executive 
agencies to submit their products for dissemination may be understood as a way of both 
protecting the agencies’ prerogatives to form contracts with private publishers, effecting the 
conversion to privately owned commodity directly, as well as preventing GPO from diluting 
the value of these publications to the private sector by making the information too generally 
available.  
Many of these early attempts to limit government “competition”—introduction of fees for 
government run databases and increasing the sales cost of GPO publications—proved too 
ham-fisted to be politically feasible and were therefore short lived.39 Total commodification 
of public information, such as the formation of contracts which transfer copyright to private 
publishers, has remained much more of a problem at the state level, where there are no 
uniform legal requirements to keep this information in the public domain or distribute 
information through public channels. However, in the end, the development of new 
information technology and the lack of established norms regarding public access to 
electronic data has generated new possibilities and strategies for private appropriation of 
information collected and generated at public expense. With the rise of network 
technologies, private sector resale of tangible products has taken a backseat to growing 
business in data analytics. Although the industry’s tune has not changed with respect to the 
37 See Smith, supra note 13 at 46; see also Jonathan Cope, Neoliberalism and Library & Information 
Science: Using Karl Polanyi’s Fictitious Commodity as an Alternative to Neoliberal Conceptions of 
Information, PROGRESSIVE LIBR.,Winter 2014/2015, at 67, 74,  
http://www.progressivelibrariansguild.org/PL/PL43/067.pdf.
38 Smith, supra note 13, at 12; James P. Love, The Marketplace and Electronic Government Information, 
19 GOV’T PUBLICATIONS REV. 397, 399 (1992), https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9390(92)90031-6  . 
39 See J. Timothy Sprehe, The New Heresy: Librarians in Support of User Fees, 19 GOV.’T PUBLICATIONS 
REV. 119, 120 (1992), https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9390(92)90084-O.
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demand that the government not “compete” with the private sector, it has thrown its support 
behind open government data programs such as the one created by President Obama early in
his administration.40 Despite the rhetoric of transparency and democratic values invoked by 
proponents of open government data, the core proposition of the open data movement is that
government must prioritize the provision of data in raw machine-readable formats that are 
essentially unusable to individual consumers.41 The fact that these data are being made 
available free of charge have effect permitted information industry to have it both ways—to 
coopt the language of openness and freedom of information long used in opposition to 
privatization to create a relationship of dependency for information dissemination that 
accrues to the benefit of the private sector.
The Limits of the Liberal Conception of Access to 
Government Information
Derived from its view of information as commodity, the Reaganite program of privatization 
of government information generated controversy within the library profession. The ALA, 
American Association of Law Libraries, and various practitioners and academics were 
largely united in their denunciation of privatization and commodification of government 
information and resisted the narrow vision of public access to information articulated in 
policies such as OMB circular A-130 that restricted the idea of public access to on-demand 
inspection rather than widespread dissemination to the public. To their credit, librarians and 
professional library associations have argued for a more robust definition of access that 
requires the government to make important information available to the public by publishing
and distributing it widely, as well as make provision for the retention of information over 
time as has long been part of the mission of the FDLP.  
These criticisms derived from a conception of information as a public good. However, the 
scope of the critique has been limited by its entanglement with classical liberalism and the 
narrow interpretation of democracy derived from it. Classical liberalism maintains a strict 
separation between the public sphere of state activity and a private sphere that includes the 
40 See SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Data Driven Innovation: A Guide for 
Policymakers: Understanding and Enabling the Economic and Social Value of Data 25 (2013), 
http://www.siia.net/Portals/0/ppt/Policy/Data%20Driven%20Innovation/data-driven-innovation.pdf?
ver=2013-07-08-135946-000; see also Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Information 
Industry Association, to John P. Holdren, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy (June 19, 
2009), http://www.siia.net/Portals/0/pdf/siia_opengovcomments_061909.pdf?ver=2009-06-23-134243-
000.
41 See Rebecca Kunkel, The U.S. Government Manual in XML: A Case Study of A Data.gov Open Data 
Set, 35 LEGAL. REF. SERVICES Q. 256, 264 (2016).
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realm of market activity.42 It is intently focused on “negative” freedom, or freedom from 
coercion by the state, but maintains that, with a few limited exceptions, private economic 
activity is essentially free and uncoerced.43 The idea of democracy that emerges from 
classical liberalism is largely confined to keeping government from overreaching into the 
private realm as opposed to, for example, focusing on the right of workers to determine for 
themselves the conditions under which they labor.  
As John Buschman noted in 2007, most discussions of democracy in LIS scholarship have 
continued to rehearse the same pieties about the importance of access to information to 
democracy derived from the classical liberal tradition—in particular the writing of Jefferson 
and Madison—without really attempting to articulate the connection.44 The result has been a
kind of magical thinking, that simply by providing access to information, libraries are 
furthering democracy.45 In so doing, LIS scholarship has tended to reinforce a 
formalist/proceduralist idea of equality. Formal equality, or “equality of opportunity,” in this
case with regard to the ability to access information, has long been the preferred formulation
of the idea of equality to which supporters of the “free” market—neoliberals and their 
classical liberal forbears—have aspired.46  
To the extent that the liberal tradition regards the problem of information privatization as an 
issue implicating egalitarian concerns, it is by worrying over access restrictions such as user 
fees creating unequal access and a resulting division between the “information-rich” and 
“information-poor,” or, in an updated version of this, a “digital divide.”47 Since its coinage 
during the Clinton administration, the digital divide has been leveraged by tech 
42 See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.PENN. L. REV. 
1349 (1982). https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4675&context=penn_law_review; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U.PENN L. REV. 1423 (1982), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4677&context=penn_law_review. 
43 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 
(1923) DOI: 10.2307/2142367; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12354&context=journal_articles; see 
also Morton J. Horwitz, Conceptualizing the Right of Access to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REV. 105 
(2004), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4449&context=wlr. 
44 John Buschman, Democratic Theory in Information Science: Toward an Emendation, 58 J. AMER. SOC. 
INFO. SCI. AND TECH. 1483 (2007), https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1066&context=lib_pub 
45 See id. at 1492.
46 Morton J. Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J. L. & ECON. 621 (1976), 
https://doi.org/10.1086/466890.
47 See Siobhan Stevenson, Digital Divide: A Discursive Move Away from the Real Inequities, 25 INFO. 
SOC’Y 1 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1080/01972240802587539.
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entrepreneurs such as Microsoft’s Bill Gates to generate good PR while simultaneously 
expanding a captive consumer base for their products.48 However, the notion of information 
poverty places far too much emphasis on the role of information as a cause of substantive 
inequality between classes. It implies that, like other limited interventions in market 
conditions permitted by economic liberalism, by fixing inequalities in the provision of access
to information (or education, or jobs, or justice, etc.), one can “fix” what is in fact a 
structural feature of capitalist class formation. This is an idea that has at best served as a 
distraction from analysis of the relationship between the state, information policy, and the 
reproduction of class inequality. This failure to engage seriously with class analysis has in 
turn left the defenders of free access to government information open to the conservative 
charge that supporters of the FDLP are hypocritically defending their own interests and 
those of the few privileged individuals such as academics who actually make use of 
depository collections.49  
Focusing on formal equality of access to information has also occluded some of the more 
pressing issues that have emerged in the age of electronic publishing. As noted above, the 
transition to electronic formats has subtly shifted the mechanism for access to information to
one that necessarily utilizes privately held utilities, software products, and maintenance 
services. This transition has created an ongoing relationship of dependency known as 
“vendor lock-in” which gives rise to a continuing commitment to the transfer of public 
wealth to the private sector.50 The electronic environment has also created new models for 
profiteering off information utilizing new modes of exploitation. When profits are extracted 
from more traditional arrangements, such as subscriptions and other user charges, the 
critique of capitalist practices and the liberal concern with equal access happen to converge. 
However, in what is emerging as the dominant mode of e-commerce, information is made 
available to the end user free of charge in exchange for the extraction of personal data about 
the user that is in turn sold to marketers.51 Open government data provide a free source of 
raw materials for companies that operate on this model.52 The transition from government 
48 Lily Geismer, Let Them Eat Tech, DISSENT MAG., Fall 2019, 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/let-them-eat-tech.
49 Bruce Morton, Perceptions of Power, the People, and Future Access to U.S. Government Information, 7 
DttP: DOCUMENTS TO THE PEOPLE, Mar. 1989, at 7, 9.
50 Gabor Laszlo, Issues and Aspects of Open Source Software Usage and Adoption in the Public Sector, in 
SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS, 1577, 1591 (Pierre
F. Tiako ed., 2009).
51 See Ishmael Burdeau, The Last Great Enclosure: The Crisis of the General Intellect, 18 WORKINGUSA 
649, 657-58 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1111/wusa.12217.
52 To name one example, Cronometer.com, which encourages users to enter information about their dietary
Journal of Radical Librarianship, Vol. 6 (2020) pp. 1–15.
11
publications to government data channels users seeking information into such arrangements, 
which amount to the extraction of value from unpaid labor on the part of the user.53 This is 
an aspect of the emerging model of open government data that has not been clearly 
understood due to its invisibility from a liberal perspective focused on access to information.
Conclusion 
Welfare states attempted to partially rectify the private tyranny of capitalist exploitation 
while leaving the basic capitalist relations of production intact. They achieved this in part by 
mitigating private accumulation through taxation and using this wealth to build public 
institutions. The resurgence of capitalist class power in the neoliberal era is not simply a 
question of the widening gap between the rich and poor, but a new attempt to turn the 
“pigmy property of the many,”54 built up during the post-war years, over to private control 
by the upper classes. As Faith Agostine-Wilson neatly summarizes this most recent round of 
enclosures, “capitalism has managed to refashion the role of government into a giant 
publically-funded product development arm—the government makes the initial investments 
into large projects, then business watches to see what might pan out, and finally swoops in to 
privatize and make money from the collective work of others, all while fighting to abolish 
corporate taxation and minimize regulations.”55 The privatization and restriction of 
government information is not always or even primarily about preventing public access but 
should be viewed as part of the larger project of effecting this transfer.
habits into an app which generates a profile of the nutritional information about the foods they are eating
pulled from various sources, including the USDA. This user activity generates an enormous amount of 
valuable information for marketers. According to the privacy policy that grants near total discretion to 
the company on the use of information that users enter into the app, Cronometer promises “not transfer 
your Personal Information,” except to unspecified “business partners” who “agree to comply with 
legally required privacy standards and who will use the information only for the purposes disclosed at 
the time of collection or for a use consistent with that purpose,” Chronometer.com, Privacy Policy (Feb. 
4th 2018), https://cronometer.com/privacy. 
53 Burdeau, supra note 46, at 658.
54 KARL MARX, Capital, Vol. 1, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 191, 316 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972), 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm  . 
55 Faith Agostinone-Wilson, A Critical Overview of Knowledge Commons from a Marxist Perspective, 4 
KNOWLEDGE CULTURES 176, 203 (2016).
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